


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By TOWNSEND and TOWNSEND and CREW LLP  
*Linda Sheffer*

PATENT

Attorney Docket No. 021288-001610

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In re application of:

Qiang Ding *et al.*

Application No.: 10/817,328

Filed: April 1, 2004

For: NOVEL COMPOUNDS AND  
COMPOSITIONS AS PROTEIN  
KINASE INHIBITORS

Customer No.: 20350

Confirmation No. 1133

Examiner: Venkataraman Balasubramanian

Art Unit: 1624

RESPONSE TO RESTRICTION  
REQUIREMENT

Commissioner for Patents  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

In response to the Restriction Requirement mailed August 4, 2005, Applicants elect, with traverse, to prosecute the claims of Group II, claims 1 and 6-17, drawn to the compound of Formula I, wherein X<sup>1</sup> or X<sup>2</sup> is nitrogen and the other is carbon, namely, pyrimidine, composition and method of use. Further, in response to the Species Election, Applicants elect the species of 3-[6-(4-trifluoromethoxy-phenylamino)-pyrimidin-4-yl]-benzamide, which is set forth in Example 6 on page 25 of the specification.

Applicants respectfully traverse the Restriction Requirement on at least two grounds. First, the Restriction Requirement does not follow the procedure set forth in 37 CFR § 1.141-1.146 and the corresponding sections of the MPEP for handling generic claims. According to 37 CFR § 1.141, an applicant may not claim two or more independent and distinct inventions in a single application “except that more than one species of an invention . . . may be specifically claimed in different claims in one national application, provided the application also includes an allowable claim generic to all the claimed species and all the claims to species in excess of one are written in dependent form or otherwise include all the limitations of the generic claim” (emphasis added). Thus, “[w]here an application contains a generic claim for all of the disclosed species, a restriction usually is not proper.” *R2 Medical Systems, Inc. v. Katecho, Inc.*, 931 F. Supp. 1397, 1436, n. 16, n. 17 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

The procedure for handling applications that include generic claims is set forth in 37 CFR § 1.146. This rule provides that “[i]n the first action on an application containing a generic claim to a generic invention (genus) and claims to more than one patentably distinct species embraced thereby, the examiner may require the applicant in the reply to that action to elect a species of his or her invention to which his or her claim will be restricted if no claim to the genus is found to be allowable.” As stated in MPEP § 809.02(a), “[u]pon the allowance of a generic claim, applicant will be entitled to consideration of claims to additional species which are written in dependent form or otherwise include all the limitations of an allowed generic claim as provided by 37 CFR § 1.141.” Thus, where generic claims are present, an applicant can be required to elect a species for initial examination, but the generic claims are still subject to examination to determine whether such generic claims are allowable.

In the instant case, the required procedure is not being followed. Claim 1 is a *proper* generic claim within the requirements set forth in 37 CFR § 1.141. In the Restriction Requirement, the Examiner alleges that the claims are “directed to structurally dissimilar compounds that lack common core, namely, triazine versus pyrimidine versus pyridine core compounds,” and “[c]onsequently, the groups require separate classification and prior art searches” (*see*, page 3 of the Restriction Requirement). However, claim 1 satisfies the definition

of a generic claim as set forth in MPEP § 806.04(d), in that this generic claim does not include limitations that are not present in all claims that depend from it. Therefore, claim 1 is, in fact, a proper generic claim. As such, in the present case, an election of species requirement is permissible, but a restriction requirement is not.

Moreover, because the restriction requirement splits a single claim, *i.e.*, claim 1, into multiple groups, *i.e.*, **three** groups, the restriction requirement is improper as a matter of law. The courts have long held that the section of the patent statute that authorizes restriction practice, *i.e.*, 35 U.S.C. § 121, provides no legal authority to impose a rejection on a single claim, even if the claim presents multiple independently patentable inventions. See, *In re Weber*, 198 USPQ 328, 331 (CCPA 1978); *In re Haas*, 179 USPQ 623, 624-625 (*In re Haas I*) (CCPA 1973) and *In re Haas* 198 USPQ 334-337 (*In re Haas II*) (CCPA 1978). As stated in *In re Weber*:

The discretionary power to limit one applicant to one invention is no excuse at all for refusing to examine a broad generic claim—no matter how broad, which means no matter how many independently patentable inventions may fall within it. 198 USPQ 328 at 334.

As such, the Examiner's statement that "the generic linking claim 16 is improper, because different members of the claims are patentably distinct and thus not linked to each other" is not proper grounds for issuing a restriction requirement (*see*, page 2 of the Restriction Requirement). Again, as mentioned above, the courts have long held that the section of the patent statute that authorizes restriction practice, *i.e.*, 35 U.S.C. § 121, provides no legal authority to impose a rejection on a single claim, even if the claim presents multiple independently patentable inventions.

Moreover, in a case such as the instant case, where a claim is generic, a Restriction Requirement is tantamount to a rejection of the claim. The CCPA made this point very clear in *In re Haas I*:

We find that the action taken by the examiner did in fact amount to a rejection. . . . Those claims were withdrawn from consideration

not only in this application but prospectively in any subsequent application because of their content. In effect there had been a denial of patentability of the claims. Presumably only by dividing the subject matter into separate, and thus different, claims in plural applications could an examination of the patentability of their subject matter be obtained. 179 USPQ at 625.

If the instant Restriction Requirement is allowed to stand, Applicants will never be accorded “the basic right of the applicant to claim his invention as he chooses.” *In re Weber*, 198 USPQ at 331. In *In re Weber*, the CCPA stated that “[a]s a general proposition, an applicant has a right to have *each* claim examined on the merits” (198 USPQ at 331, emphasis in original). The Court went on to state that:

If . . . a single claim is required to be divided up and presented in different applications, that claim would never be considered on its merits. The totality of the resulting fragmentary claims would not necessarily be the equivalent of the original claim. Further, since the subgenera would be defined by the examiner rather than by the applicant, it is not inconceivable that a number of the fragments would not be described in the specification.” 198 USPQ at 331.

Even if Applicants were to file *three* divisional applications to obtain coverage for the claims in each of the *three* groups set forth in the Restriction Requirement, they would not have the opportunity to have their broader claim examined. The claims of the *three* divisional applications would be limited to the particular species set forth in each of the *three* respective groups. In effect, the Restriction Requirement is reading into Applicants’ independent claim limitations that are not present in the claim as filed. Claim 1, for example, would never be considered under the current Restriction Requirement. Only the dependent claims which are set forth in the respective groups would be examined.

For at least the foregoing two reasons, the Restriction Requirement set forth by the Examiner is improper and should be withdrawn.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.144, Applicants reserve the right to petition for review of the Restriction Requirement at any time prior to appeal.


Attorney Docket No. 021288-001610  
Application No.: 10/817,328  
Page 5

PATENT

Applicants also note that because the instant rejection is tantamount to a rejection of the generic claim, the restriction requirement is appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  
*In re Haas, supra.*

If the Examiner has any questions regarding Applicants' election, or if the Examiner believes a telephone conference would expedite prosecution of this application, please telephone the undersigned at (925) 472-5000.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eugenia Garrett-Wackowski". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the last name being particularly prominent.

Eugenia Garrett-Wackowski  
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